Speaker: Timothy Williamson (Oxford)

Title: Absolute Provability and Safe Knowledge of Axioms

Abstract: Absolute provability is provability by any reasonable logical or mathematical means, as opposed to provability in some given formal system. Gödel's incompleteness theorems do not settle whether all mathematical truths are absolutely provable. The talk will present an argument that the answer is positive for rather superficial and non-technical epistemological reasons compatible with the assumption that each of the relevant knowing subjects has only the computational power of a Turing machine.

Speaker: Shyam Nair (USC)

Title: Must Good Reasoning Be Cumulative Transitive?

NOTE: this is a discussion session on the following paper, to be read ahead of time: https://www.dropbox.com/s/g93h1s71s5tdj59/nair-socalphilmath-feb2014.pdf
Abstract:
One way agents rationally come to have new attitudes is by reasoning well from other attitudes that they have. While the project of understanding such good reasoning is on going, it turns out that philosophers and computer scientists have converged on a view about the structure of good reasoning. Roughly, the idea is that if two pieces of reasoning are good considered on their own, then the larger piece of reasoning that consists of performing these two pieces of reasoning back-to-back is also good. In formal terminology, this is the idea that good reasoning satisfies cumulative transitivity. And this is an important idea because it is implicated in almost every puzzle about reasoning that arises in philosophy, logic, and computer science. This makes it a pressing question whether this convergence among theorists is just an accident or if it reveals the deeper truth that good reasoning must be cumulative transitive. In order to evaluate this question, I first extract a series of arguments from work in philosophical logic and computer science that suggests that good reasoning must be cumulative transitive and argue that they fail. I then develop a broadly foundationalist epistemology that not only is compatible with good reasoning failing to satisfy cumulative transitivity but combined with certain other claims, actually entails that good reasoning fails to satisfy cumulative transitivity.

Speaker: Yiannis N. Moschovakis (UCLA)

Title: The logical form and meaning of attitudinal sentences

Abstract. The theory of referential intensions provides a mathematical model for a standard (if controversial) understanding of Frege's sense, and in the first half of this lecture I will give a brief outline of its main ideas and results. In the second half I will discuss some examples which illustrate its possible applications to the philosophy of language and linguistics, especially in the treatment of propositional attitudes; this was introduced in a preliminary way in [4] and is still work in progress. The two-page introduction to [2] gives a good idea of what this research program is about.

References, all posted on http://www.math.ucla.edu/~ynm:

[1] Sense and denotation as algorithm and value (1994).

[2] A logical calculus of meaning and synonymy (2006).

[3] Two aspects of situated meaning, with Eleni Kalyvianaki (2008).

[4] A logic of meaning and synonymy, with Fritz Hamm (2010).

Speaker: Henri Galinon (Université Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand / ENS).

Title : Truth as a logical notion

Abstract : We argue in favor of a deflationary conception of truth that takes seriously the idea that truth is a logical notion. We shall discuss some advantages of this thesis and present a few ways to make it precise.