Logic & Philosophy of Science
Peter Vanderschraaf
Department of Philosophy
Carnegie Mellon University
Instituting the Hobbesian Commonwealth
In Leviathan and De Cive, Hobbes distinguishes between two accounts of
the origins of a commonwealth. A commonwealth established by force,
say by conquest or by coup, is a commonwealth by acquisition. A
commonwealth established by the mutual agreement of individuals in
their natural condition of political freedom is a commonwealth by
institution (Hobbes 1651). In this paper, I consider exactly what is
involved in commonwealth by institution and how well it serves as an
element of Hobbes' political theory. First, I review Hobbes' account
of commonwealth by institution in Leviathan and try to fill in the
gaps Hobbes leaves behind in his own account. Second, I consider
several objections to the idea of commonwealth by institution. Hobbes
is frequently criticized for introducing commonwealth by institution
into his overall argument, both on the grounds that actual
commonwealths are not created by institution, and because a
commonwealth could only be instituted by parties who have a decisive
reason to comply with the agreement they make, which on Hobbes' view
they won't. I disagree with these criticisms, but raise another
criticism, namely, that the parties apparently would be unable to
decide how to decide who to authorize as the sovereign of their
commonwealth at the onset, unless they resort to choosing their
sovereign at random. I conclude that this odd claim may actually
cohere better with Hobbes' overall theory than Hobbes' claim that
parties would choose their sovereign by election, although it may make
one less inclined to accept commonwealth by institution as a tool for
moral justification, as Hobbes wants to. Finally, I consider the
possibility of making commonwealth by institution more plausible by
relaxing one of Hobbes' premises. Hobbes draws and uses a conclusion
most now regard as empirically false, namely, that rational
individuals will always regard monarchy as the strictly best form of
commonwealth. I conclude that if State of Nature parties do not have
a strict preference for monarchy, they might be inclined to vote for,
and thus institute, a democratic commonwealth.
Friday, May 21, 1999
12:00 p.m. SST 777
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