Abstract:

I will consider Russell's analysis of perception in terms of momentary particulars and their spatial structure, starting from his "break through" in the 1914 paper "Relation of Sense-Data to Physics." While remaining vigilant to any changes that occurred as he adopted neutral monism, and to whether he retained that position in the Analysis of Matter (1927), I will focus on his problems in describing the geometrical structure of the "at which," with an eye to what they may reveal about persisting problems concerning the geometry of visual space.

As background reading, I've sent a pdf of the 1914 paper (which is reprinted in Mysticism and Logic), and, as optional reading, a previous paper of mine on "Psychology, Epistemology, and the Problem of the External World: Russell and Before," which some may find of interest for the context it provides.

Russell 1914
Hatfield Paper